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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) NO. 44432
)
v. ) BANNOCK CO. NO. CR 2012-16304
)





The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Gibbs’s Probation And Executed
His Underlying Sentence But Reduced The Indeterminate Portion Of His Sentence By One Year
A. Introduction
Despite the fact that Mr. Gibbs had a job opportunity, which could have allowed him to
pay off his fines and finally get his life in order, he is still needlessly sitting in prison.  Indeed,
instead of imposing an alternative sentence that would have allowed Mr. Gibbs to secure
employment while on work release, the district court revoked Mr. Gibbs’s probation and
executed his underlying sentence but reduced the fixed portion of that sentence by one year.  In
his opening brief, Mr. Gibbs argued that this was an abuse of discretion because the district court
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was aware that he had consistently struggled with traditional supervision, and thus the district
court’s sentence would likely only perpetuate the cycle of incarceration followed by supervision
that Mr. Gibbs had never been able to break out of.
This reply brief is necessary to address the State’s responses that Mr. Gibbs’s argument is
barred by the doctrine of invited error, that Mr. Gibbs is a danger to society, and that—had the
district court imposed a different sentence—it would set an improper standard.
B. The Invited Error Doctrine Does Not Apply To This Situation
The invited error doctrine provides that “[a] defendant may not request a particular ruling
by the trial court and later argue on appeal that the ruling was erroneous.” State v. Griffith, 110
Idaho 613, 614 (Ct. App. 1986).  Contrary to the State’s characterization, Mr. Gibbs did not
request “that the district court revoke his probation and order executed a reduced unified
sentence of four years, with two years fixed . . . .”  (Resp. Br., p.4.)  Mr. Gibbs did propose two
options, but he said, “I would strongly ask you to please consider option number one.  I just want
this behind me.”  (7/25/16 Tr., p.150, Ls.3-5.)  Therefore, he did not request the second option.
Indeed, he made it clear that he did not want to go back to prison; instead, he wanted to take
advantage of his job opportunity, so he could “pay back” the costs of his supervision and fines as
well as “reintegrate back into society.”  (7/25/16 Tr., p.149, L.1 – p.150, L.9.)  Thus, he asked
the district court to let him do that through a work release program.  When a defendant proposes
two sentencing options but strongly expresses a preference for the first one and thus does not
specifically request the second one, the invited error doctrine should not and does not bar an
appeal; the State has cited to no case law holding otherwise.
Mr. Gibbs’s counsel also strongly advocated for the first option.  He said, the “best
approach” would be to “give [Mr. Gibbs] some period of local incarceration, give him credit for
3
the time he served, and let’s try to get John out of the system.  Let’s really get him out of the
system so he doesn’t — so he can move on with his life for once.”  (7/25/16 Tr., p.145, Ls.7-13.)
He went  on  to  say,  “As  far  as  my recommendation  .  .  .  I  think  we should  give  [Mr.  Gibbs]  a
period of local incarceration, give him work search, work release.”  (7/25/16 Tr., p.145, L.25 –
p.146,  L.2.)   The  district  court,  however,  did  not  follow  that  recommendation  or  Mr.  Gibbs’s
expressed preference.  Therefore, the invited error doctrine does not apply in this case.
C. The State’s Remaining Arguments Fail Because They Ignore The Unique Aspects Of
This Case And Rely On Dated Information In An Attempt To Portray Mr. Gibbs As A
Danger To Society
The State, relying in part on Mr. Gibbs’s record from over twenty years ago— before he
spent years in prison for the index crime in this case—attempts to portray Mr. Gibbs as a danger
to society.  (Resp. Br., p.6; PSI, pp.8-12.)  However, other than his failures to register, the only
convictions on Mr. Gibbs’s record after his release in 2007 are misdemeanors that do not indicate
he poses a significant danger of any sort.  (PSI, pp.11-12.)  Further, as detailed in his Appellant’s
Brief, Mr. Gibbs’s failures to register did not appear to be purposeful or genuine attempts to
deceive supervision.  (App. Br., pp.9-11.)  The State ignores this and—despite the fact that
Mr.  Gibbs  has  never  been  accused  of  another  sex  crime  or  attempted  to  abscond—cites  to
ominous statutory language in an effort to portray Mr. Gibbs as a man who will commit another
sex crime if given the opportunity.  (Resp. Br., p.7.)  Such a portrayal is simply not supported by
the record in this case.  As his counsel pointed out at the disposition hearing, “Is [Mr. Gibbs] at
risk  to  commit  a  sex  offense  again?   That’s  why  they  do  the  polygraphs.   The  answer  is  no.”
(7/25/16 Tr., p.146, Ls.5-7.)
The State also argues that, had the district court commuted Mr. Gibbs’s sentence and
given him a year of jail time with work release it would “set a standard that effectively sends the
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message” that defendants who fail to follow conditions of supervision are “entitled” to have their
sentences reduced.  (Resp. Br., p.6.)  This claim simply misses the point of Mr. Gibbs’s
argument.  The facts and background of this case are clearly unusual.  As such, if the district
court decided to commute Mr. Gibbs’s sentence, it would not have set a standard.  Indeed, it is
hard to imagine that any defendant would want to go through what Mr. Gibbs has endured in
order to finally be entitled to participate in a work release program.  And serving time in jail with
work release would not have been some sort of a major windfall for Mr. Gibbs.  He would still
be incarcerated every night, and he would spend the time he was released working as a baker, so
he could pay off his fines.  (7/25/16 Tr., p.146, Ls.1-5, p.149, Ls.3-10.)
As argued in the Appellant’s Brief, the district court did not reach its decision through an
exercise of reason because it imposed a similar sentence to what had been imposed previously
despite its acknowledgment that such a sentence had never produced the intended results.  (App.
Br., p.12.)  The State’s arguments fail to support the district court’s decision.  The facts of this
case  show that  Mr.  Gibbs  has  already  paid  a  huge  debt  to  society  for  his  offenses,  and  he  was
clearly aware that he could help himself to get out of the system through an alternative sentence
that allowed him to work and make positive changes in his life.  Instead, the district court




Mr. Gibbs respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate.
DATED this 7th day of June, 2017.
_________/s/________________
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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